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Examined in the Light of' the llain 
l!odern Ph1loaoph1oal Syatem ainae 
Loaka 
I.ntroduat1on. 
It haa ever been the ola1a of Lutheran theologian• that the 
theology of' the Reformed. aeot1on of the Chr1at1an oliuroh waa baaed, not 
upon Sor1pture, bqt upon a reaaonable interpretation ot Sor1pture. In 
other m>rds, to the Rei'ornmcl theologian the Bible 111 not the porna. .!!9!:-
mans, but rather the norms. no!'Dl!Lta. Reaaon 111 h1a nor-. normsna. 
Thia claim or Lutheran theology haa neTer been expreaaly de-
nied by Reformed theologians, am, 1n faat, we find. from the earl1eat 
beginnings of' Reformed theology-, atatementa whiah aeem ·to support that 
view. Thus, tor 1nate.noe, in the Genevan. C&teah1am1 written by CalTiD1 
• the question: aPoteriane ratione demonatrare, n1h11 ease 1n ea re ab-
surd.1?1 1s answered: •sane. S1 m1h1 oonoesaum 1'uer1t, n1h11 Dominum 
instituisse, quod ait a ratione dissentaneum•. (W1emayer, Collectio 
Conf'eas1onum, p.163.) 
Modern Reformed theologians han expreaaed the same thought 
w1 th more alar1ty and preo1a1on. Thua tor 1natanae, Charlea Badge in 
his Syatemat1o '!'heolog a&ya: •The Bible neTer require• ua to rece1Te 
aa true~~• wbiah the oonat1tut1on or our nature, given ua by God 
himaelt, f'orcea ua to believe f'alae or impoaa1ble•. (Il,390) A ao•-
what fuller develop•nt of th1a view 1a f'ound. 1n the authoritat1w 
Biblical Repertory and Pr1noeton Review of the year 181l$ (vol.XVll,392). 
Prom an ar1.1cle, entitled •'!'he Connection between !'htloaophy and. Rew-
lation • we have culled the following: 
111'fe haw aald that all natural phenomna., "llhether 
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physical or ps:,ahological e.re to be explained by 
philosophy, and not b:, th• 110rd.s ot Scr1ptuH. But 
it 111 important to observe that there 111 a d1tterence 
between the physical and. psychological truths in the 
certainty ot which 1,hey can be made to bear upon the 
1nterpretatJon or Scripture. Thers is generally 
more certainty in our lmcmledge or phyaical than 
or psychological truth. For instance, we know with 
absolute certainty, that the earth moves around the 
sun, and that the bread and wine in the euche.riat 
are bread and ,rl.neJ 9.11d. ot course, Scripture must 
be interpreted accon11ngl:,a tor God never contra-
dicts in revelation what he baa said in nature; and. 
it mst be borne in mind, that in all phyaica all 
r e:a.son1ng rw.st •nd i n aubm1aaion to the aenaea. For 
the illusions ot sense oan only be corrected by evi-
. dence ot the same sort, where one sense 111 brought 
to t est1ty against itselt.• 
The attentive reo.d.er m.11 m.rk that the sentiments expressed 
in the foregoing quotation seem to be questionable from the stand.point 
ot a conservative Biblical scholar. It the same line ot reasoning 118N 
tollowed out to its bitter cone•quence, it would leave ' ua without any 
aupern:a.ture.l f'acts in religion. But it 111 by a •happy• 1ncona1atenoy 
that the Reformed theolog1ana 1 at least those of' the conservative school, 
have reatrioted reason aa a norm of' doctrine to the narrow sphere or 
Chriatology and the Sacr8.Jl9nta. It 111 ohietly here that they have mad.a 
use or the argWlll9nts troa possibility and reuonab111ty. It 1a these 
arguanta trom reason that• wish to examine. 
We have divided our treatise into three sections. In the tirat 
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Tl8 shall consid,r the nrguments trom re~son which sre urg,d by 
?.etormad theologilllla ~.gninst the Rel\l ?reaer.ce in th9 Lord's Supper, 
am show upon vrhnt premises and suppositions thea, arguments &M 1>cised. 
In t he seoond section we sha.ll sketch th, epistemological investigations 
or moder n philosophy since Locke; pa:,iug special att9ntion to t hose 
resltlts which have a di r ect bett.ring upon th.e prem:!.ses end suppositions 
which are bas ic t or the Reformed ar gunents. 
I . The Reformed Argument s and their Philosophical Basis . 
In delinentin3 the Rotormed objections to the Lutheran doctrine 
that Christ's bod:, and blood are re::Ll.l:,, though sacramntall;v ond not 
locally present, in the bread and wins, it ~7111 be T/811 to quote their 
object i ons, l es t e.n:, charge or rnisreprementation be lodged against our 
pr e11ent=-..t i on. 
Dr. Jolm l!liley, professor ot ~yste111Atic Th9ology at !lrew 
Tlleologi cnl Semin~r:, Uothodis t Episcopal) in his ftysteme.tio 'l'heolo~r 
( I,58) ur ges t he folloT:ir..g against the Lutheran doctrine: 
"The human n~tun as,W!'.8d by the Logos in the in-
oa.rne.tion rems.inod human, with the attributes ot the buma.n. 
In itsc,lt it possessed the ca.pa.cit:, tor onl:, su.,ch lmovrledp, 
po,•,ar, and presence e.s is possible to the human. How, then, 
could it become omniscient, omnipotent, .and omnipresent? 
The anam,r is, through the di vine n~ ture, w1 th which it \'78.B 
united. But it this union e.nllW8rs tor such l"9sults, either 
it 1111st give to the finite a.ttributea ot the human nature +.he 
plenitude or the infinite, or invest· that nature with the 
attributes ot the infinite. Attributes ot knowledge , power, 
am presence, such as ve here contemplate, a re concrete reali-
ties ot being , not mere notions or names. There can be neither 
\ 
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knowledge. nor po1'ter 9 nor preHnoe •.dthout th., app:ropriat9 
e.ttri 'bute pf being. The being ma.at anll\T9r tor the oha r aoter 
or the at tribute . and the attri"bqte mu.at an8Yl9r tor all that . 
i s a.t't i rmad of' it. Only a mind possessing the po'l'lllr ot ab-
solute knowledge can be onmisciant. Omnipotence must have 
ite ground in a will of' absolute power. Omnipresence, auch 
as the Luth,rnn ChristoloSY arrirma or the hum.m nature of' 
Christ, is possible only Tlith an infinite ex1:=9naion of' being. 
Hence , either the f'inite attributes or the hwm.n natur, assWll8cl 
. 
by the Logos nust be lifted into the infinitude of' the divin, 
att ributes, or the divine attribu.tea must be invested in the 
hmnan nature 1 ,mich is ir..trinsicall:, tini t.e, and ,mioh in it-
selr, even as the Luthera.~ Christology conc,dea 9 must aver 
remain rini te. • 
•It is at tbis point that the doctrine encounters 
insuperable ditticulties 1 even absolute im.poasibilitiea. 
There is !10 possibility tha.t the human DB.ture or Christ should 
posses s the attributes of' omniscience. om!li.potence. and omni-
presence·, \'lhioh the Luth9ran Christology ascribes to it. It 
;ta properly regarded as an u:iom. that the tinite haa not a 
capacity f'or the infinite - 'Finitum !!2D. capax infiniti•. 
The principle is absolutely true in application to the ,oints 
,mioh we here nake. The finite attributes or the human nature 
can neither be enlarged to the intinitude of' the divine a.ttri-
bu.tes. nor receive into themselves the plenitude or the divine. 
Heither can the finite nature of' man receive~• investment 
of these divine attributes. But there can be no omniaoience 
without the a.ttri"bqte of absolute kno,rl.ng; no onm.ipotence ot 
ot being without a w11-l of' absolute power; no omipreaence 
s 
or bein:; 'C"lithout an in1'1nit, extension. Hen a.re the im-
possibilities whioh the wthersn Christology encounters in 
the ascription or such a.ttributea to the humm nat,.ire ot 
Christ. 0 
In this line or argumentation 11gainat th9 Lutherm doctrine, 
TI8 rind that Dr. Uiley ho.s based his ,mole ar~ument on th-.a t\70 st!lt9-
monts: 1. 0 Attributes or kn~1ledzo, poTrer, and presence ••• are 
concret9 r9!1.li ti s , not msre notions or n2!!i!ts. • !>r. Uilay here s.aawms 
that the t-.ttributss or knowledge, pc>\Ter, end preaence have an existence 
outside or t he porcGivir.g mind. No~ the attribut, •pros9nce• is oqui-
val nnt to th':! {l..ttribut-.: or extonsioni tho ~ttribute "pov:ar• implies 
the !do~ or rorce , motion, cause and errocti ~nd the attribute •knowledge• 
1s b11aed. on the idea or understanding. He aasum'!s that the a.ttributea 
or ~xtonsion, mobility, and the notions or cause and etract, and under-
stunding can in no sense be separated from the obj~cta in which they 
inhere. 
His "Jecond sta.tem,nt is: •The being mat a.ne-::ur ror the 
cbo.rl'l'.cter or th9 a.ttribute; and the a ttribute mu.at anst'l8r for a.11 that 
i s o.rr1rm9d or i ·t•. l!e makes the !l.asertion that e.ttributea condition 
b9ing. Aga.in he assum9s th~t an attribute ia cm eaaantie.l part or an 
object, that t.~e attributes are realities outside or :the mind which 
perceives them. 
Or. Robert L. Dabney, pro.resaor at the Union Theolo~ical 
Se~ine.ry or Virginia (PrasbyteriAn1 South) aaya in hia Systematic and 
Polemic '!'beology (p.808): 
•The Lu.thersn ex,gesia ••• does not outrage the 
u.~deratnnd.ing ao mu.ch bJ1 requiring ua to believe that sub-
stance oan be aepuated for All its acoidentai for it pro-
r,ases to leave the 1ubatance or the bread untouched •••• 
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But th9 rest of my nrgu~ants (o.gainat tr~.nsubst~r.tla.tion]~pply 
agninat it, wul need n~t bs recQpitulated.n 
The Qr0 W!t'i1nt Ql,ainst tra..'lsubstantiatio::i, ,7h1ch. h9 a.. plbs to 
th.e Luther an doctrine , is r~uncl in tha sami, ,'10rk 'p. 806) :im roads 
S B rollo,·.rs : 
a.Ago.i n , it ic i mpossible tor matter to be ubiquitous; but 
Chr1st1 3 body Jil.ust b!t so, if this doctrine be true. .m.d. it 12: 
vain to ~ttGmpt 0n evQaion of these t,,10 Argmnts rrom sense and 
l't>a.so~ b)• p l adi n;s o. great 1111.d. nv,sterous mira.cle. Far Cod I a 
O1m i j;'otenco does not r10rk t he i?!l!JOosible and th• nst•1rnl contro.-
dic'tion. n 
Dr. !>nbney i n his nrgunent states tho.t it is im_po·ssible tor r.ilD.tter 
to ba ubiquitous. F.is st~tement is based upon tr.:o a.ss~ptions. First 
he a.:un:m1t s !'01· J!!..'l.tter an eT.istence independent or the min~ of' the 
,srceivir.g subjoct. He ~lso QCCepts •nithout p?'Oof' the cle.im that ubi-
quity , i.Q. i nfinit e extension in s,ace, has objective reality, is 
c. qug,lity ,·1hicl'!. e;:ist c a~art rrom rm:, perception er that quality. 
In an e.rt!cle o"!l Trcmsubstantb.tion, raprint<Jd f'rom tbe ?ri11.cetou 
T!leo lo:;i cal Review in a colloction or Theo logic14. EH ays , edi tad b:, 
Fatrick Fairbairn, (P• 366) we rind the following atriotures against 
t.~e Lutheran doctrine of' the Real Presence: 
nl'h1<> Luth'JrllJlB \"lho ad.opted. the o~inion that there was no 
chAnge or the brawl and wine into the 'body and. blood. or Christ, 
yet maintained the.t the rea.l bocly and blood or Christ ".TClre 
present with these elements and Ytere reoeived. b:, every communi-
cant whether in the exercise or f'aith or not. And \'Then urged. 
1n controversy with th, Ref'ormad. mth 1,he consequence that this 
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rendered it n!lcessa.r:,• that the body or Christ should exist every-
\-:he1·e, they admitted the inf'-,rance, and held tho ubiquity or 
C"nr1st•s bod~•i but th:!.s was to attribute to a tinita and cr!9n.t9d 
nature one or tho attributes or Deity. Therefore they adopted 
tile Qbsu:rwi op:!.nion, t hat, 1n consequence or t.~e hypostatical 
union, d i vine Qttributes were actually communicated to the human 
na.ture or Chr:!.st. But another stubborn difficulty attended this 
hypothesis . It is the property or all bodies to exclude all otller 
bodias from the space which they occupyi he?1Ce, if ubiquity be 
e.scr1 bed tc Christ• s bod:,, 1 t '11111 exclude all ot.lier bodies rrom 
th9 univorso. 'l'11ere was no D?athod or obviating this objection, 
but by iving e new definition or body; and here \'ID.S open9d a 
!'ield r~r abstruse speoul~tion which obcupied the learning and 
l abours or men or tile f':!.rst order or intellect; and when they 
lli-.d cc:Apleted their theory, it ,.,s.s impossible to say ~':'hat ..-:na 
e ssenti~l to body, or in what respect they who held a bodily 
presance or Christ di!'f'ared :f'rom those wllo :n~intn.inad that he 
was really but spiritually pr-,sant.• 
The writer of this article urges a ne\T a.rgum-,nt, at least in 
f'orm, 11' not in substance, T:hen he so.ya: •It ia the property ot' all 
bot.lies to exclude all other bodies from the apace they occup:,h But 
wllen we reduce the statement to a syllogism, v,e rind in the major 
premise the axiom that matter ia impenetrable, wich still remains to 
be proved. Beto1•e the Drgwmnt can have validity, it lllll■t be abown 
that th• attribute ot impenetrability ia nenr am in no c1rcum-
atancea aoniathiJll& subjective, aometb1ng to which the perceivi~ 
subject haa given existence. 
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Dr._ tJhsrlas Hodsa • perhaps the ireatest Rel'orm,d th,olo,gian in 
Alllllrica9 aa:,s in his ,§:£!.,te]!9.tic Th9ology ( II, ,390) 1 
•The properties or attributes of' a substancll cons titute its 
essence , so t hat if' tho:, bo removed and other of' a ditf'ersnt 
nature nre t>.dded to them, the substance itself' is chs.n:;'9d. It 
you t ake r ationality f'rom mind, it ceases to b, mind. If' you add 
.r Ationality to matter, it ceas,s to be ?::Lttsr. If' you mde th~t 
extended, which is in itaelr incapable or e aten~ion, th9 identity 
or the t..'l\ing i s lost. n 
A further e laboration of the same argu111Bnt is f'ound in the 
St\1118 ,·10rk ( II, 417): 
11 lt i a a. f'atal objection w the, doctrine 11nder conaidern-
tion th~t it involves the physical i mpossibility that attributes 
are sepa r able from the subs t ances of ,mich they are a manifasta-. 
t ion. This 1E tho same kind of in:posaib1lity as action rrithout 
Z?Ornsthing a ct~ng; or motion d thout somethiq moving... If 
Chr1ot•s body is over~here present, then it ls th, substance 
or th t body, e.!'ld ng~ the essence of' ~od that 1s • mni prasent. 
The Luthara."1 doctrine, hov,ever, is that the essantia.l attributes 
or pro,erties or the tv:o ns.turas rem!Lin uncha.91g,d ~f'ter the hy1,o-
at!!.tics.l union. '!'he properties o~ the divine 9Saence do not ~-
come 1>rop9rties or the hwn!lD. Then the humanity of Christ h9a 
tho attributes or his divinity without its essence, and yet theae 
attributes or properties do not inhere in his human aubstance . 11 
9 
I1' \'t'9 recluce the f'irst u.r1;wnent th!l.t "the propertie,s or attr1-
biit9£ 0 1' a sub:-:tmce oonst1 tut'l its ese'lnoe•, \'18 find th'l. t it m.11 
l'9o.d.: 11 • ~ubet a."1.ce ! s t ho awn or !ts a.ttributea 11 • • T!le E9Ct'n'.! s.riu-
ment: 11Att1•!butes are insepara.1>le tro'l!l tha substan09E or v,h!ch ths:, 
ara a. J111.mitest2.tion II oe.n be 1-ed uced to the ba.re tom: 11 t.n. a.t·tri bute 
is an e s sent i al part or a. substunco 8 • Dr. Hod~e himself sta~a the 
o.ss11mpt !on •.,hioh underlies both or th9se stetemnts , when he ~rs: 
•T"ne a.ttr! bii tes ••• inhe re i n ••• subste.nce•. 
Dr. ~~ . A. Hod.Ge , succesGo r t o bi'! r a.ther, Charles !lodge, in the 
chdr or ~:,r1:rl.am2.tic 'l'haolosy a.t Princeton Theolog icru. 13om1na.r:,, st:ltes 
his objections to the Lutheran doctrine in his Q.q,tli?!!.!, 2.t Theolo::g, 
( p . 385) a s fol lows: 
11 ne r s ject the Lutheran v!ew, because, ••• Fourth, it in-
vol v~1 the ra.llaoy or conceiving or properti es as separable 
rrom the substances of which they are active po~er s , l1!d thus 
i ,: open t ,;, the ga.m9 cr1 t!c! -,:n 'lC the doctrine or tr!'.nsubstmtis.-
. tion . 
Tis e:tr:ictl.'!.r -J s .a ~ ins:t +.h9 ~octri110 or tre.nsub9tantia.ti u , hiob 
ho nl .. o a:,plbo to the, Luthi,nn doctrine a.re f.'ound in the aa.T.:'! work 
(p. 386) c.ni r s ~d as rollom:: 
"But this doctrine [or trruu:ubs te.ntiation] contrCLdicts th., 
principle or reason, 1. •:11th reapsot to ths nature or Christ's 
body, b:, supposing tbt although it :!.s ma.terial , it ma:, be, 
w1 thout division, wholly present in he aven, and at many 411!-
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i'erent pl a.oes on earth at the same tlma , 2. in m'l.intaining thn.t 
th~ body and blood ot .Chri ~t are present in the sa.orr..J11Dnt 1 ~et 
u i thout l1DY' or their sens ible qualit i es.• 
The argunYJnt t hat properties ~re insep~rable from the substance 
or '1." hi oh th0:,, r e a.ot i v':t powers 1s but a r est~terr.ent or thl'J ta.1!'.il1e.r 
a rgumnt tho.t a.ttributea nro Mi essential part ot a substance . It is 
be.sad on the "'O.Jli.'l o.ssurn1>t i on th'l.t a.ttri but,s inhe re in 1r.:1tter. Hodge' a 
seccnrl a rgument, th0 .t ?llt'.tt9r Cl'l.D ot •::ithou -1: divi s ion bo com,;,l etely 
present i n hea.ven, ~.nd ~t many d!i'£erent pl acas on 9a.rth a t the s~me 
t i me , i s based on t he assumption t ha t ma.t ter has form and extension 
1:i spt-.ce a.9 fln e Esentic.l part or 1 ts bsi~. The third argument is the , 
converse of thiJ f i rst , in stating thnt a ttributes u e a.!!!!! qua mm, 
or - 9Ubot~nce , a.nd i s again based on the ~esumpt ion that e t t ribu.t ea 
he.ve wi ex! st ence apart from th9 mind ,rh.ich ::,ercei V9 8 them. 
But Dr •.• A. liod~e states his assumption in still clear•r lan-
guage •::h'!n he cays that properties nre the activ~ powerg or the aub-
ste.nce . He hero assumes a. causal connection between substance and 
attribute, and this goes !liUCh de9per into the fundamental philosophical. 
doctrine unde r~yi~ his objection. Ee assumes a necessary connection 
between subs t Nioa and attri'bute . · 
Dr. \.illie.m. a. Shadd, professor or Systematic Theology at t'nion 
Theological. Seminary, sa:,s in his Dogmatic Theology CI!, .$68): 
•But the glorified body or Chris t, though a spiritual body ••• 
has torm and is extended 1n apace • • . "3\.\'t one and. the aama f'orm. 
cannot occupy two or more space a at one and the 111ama moment.• 
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Dr. Shedd obliGingly giv-,s us his aaaumptions, '.'lhile stating hia 
ugument against tb.9 Lutheran dootrbJ.e. Bia ■tatem,nt, that one and 
the &0.11'.e form OMnot oooupy t,:,o or more spsces e:t one am tho same 
moment 1s ba.sed on the e.aaumption thD.t torm and extension in space 
arc, attributes or mstter which inhere in the substance apart from the 
psrceivin11; subject. 
I t will bs .ell no~T to GWIIJl!llrize the various ass~tions ,:,hich 
are b11.sic i'o1· the R formed a.rgumenta. The:, !I.re bs.e:ecl on the follow-
ing prosunpositions: 
1. Th~ nttributes ot extension, mobility, impenetrability or 
solidity, ~ml form exist a.part from any perceiving subject. 
2. The idea. or substance he.a a counterpart in reality. 
3. The idec of cause is objectively val!d. 
To sum up, the v~lidity or the Rei'or~.ed argu119nts ~gainst the 
Luth~ran position on the Re!l.l Presence or the Body snd Blood or Christ 
in the Lord's Suppgr is ccnti~ent upon the validity or the attributes 
or extension, J!l'Jbllity, impenetrability, and fcnn ae existing inde-
pendently or any paroeivin:; agency; and upon the objective validity 
or the i deas of m~ttsr and o~uaa. · 
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n. 'odern Philosophical Investigations in Epistemology 
and their Results. 
Up to the ti"'le or Locke ( 16,32-1704) ph:l.losoph:, had. conoel'?lsd it-
self' priri1n1'1ly with the problem or be:!.ng ( ontolos:,) and had hurriecll:, 
p:iosod. ove ?.· ·the problem or kno•tled~e (ep:!.~temolo~), \'lhich d'ter s.ll 
i s basic t or o.n:, rn~t a.:,hysica.l specul~~on. It was Locke who !'!rst 
oxa.nPined t h davel -opmnt or hum.'l.n lmowled.ge fl!ld. the· f orms and prewp -
posi t i ons 1hic h i ·t h!!s :it its dispost'.l. In tra-:,ir..g the developm nt 
or 9pi stemol 0~i cnl i nvest:!.gct i ons ¥te shall only t eJ;e cosn:!.z~~C9 or 
::uch h:u:e s :1s touch d i rectly the 9r obl em w:!.t h which '.'le nre concerned , 
name1y tho v11lid i t :, o!' tbe va.rious attri bu.tes and or the ides.s or sub-
stance and cnuse . 
1. IDcke 
Locl::e bssan his e~ietemolo:;icll.l s twiies by inve sti:;ei;i:ng t he 
ori gin or the i den of substnr.co. ~e di scove r ed th~+. thq :!.dos or ~ub-
st nc"l i ~ iu 1-aa.11ty a C'>mbin!.1.tior.. of' :a.t·trib\\t.es :md propertie s "llllich 
•:re e.t.tribut~ t ~ the object 1.tsel!'. Curio.is l:, enough, ho:;ewr, ·::e 
c~nce ive t he subst!Ulce itself to .be som.athing different from the 
1ua.11 tie s, ne.m9ll' tho.t ,;!hlch supports the_m. :·:e he.vs no 1dei!I. at • 11 
of pure substance, bu.t onl:, a. sup!)Osi tion of a. aorrething , ,e kno.,., not 
what, tha t baa.rs qualities • • He 11ays (Easo.y on Human Underatazt.dins, 
Book II, Cb~pt91• 2,3, Section 2.): 
•'!'he idea then Y.'8 have, to r1hich m, give the general no.m 
a1.1.bstance, being nothing but the GuiJposed, but unkno".vn support 
of those qm1.li ties •,'.'e f'ind. existing, i'.'hich '.'."9 1mag:!.ne cannot 
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ax1s·t .ll.t!!. £!. ubst;u:at9, v,i tho11t ao!f.ething 'bJ support them, • 
o-ill tha.t support aubata.ntiai v:hioh according to ths true im-
port or tho ~ord i&, in plun i:Jl..gliah, ,tanding under, ~r up-
holdin "• n 
But how about the qualiti~s th9mselves, Is ur 1i9~ of ~ttri-
butec VQlid, !..ccka answers th~ 4u9stion by dividi~ attribu~9s into 
pr! rn~ry qua.lit!9a , such 0.:1 extension, figu1·0, molJility, a.nd solid.it:,, 
wh ich P2,ra u·ttorl:,r insepar able from the body, in t'lhe.t estate ttO'SV9r 
it 1>i,n . oconcla.ry qw:.11 tis o, ho sa:,~ 1 ~ro • such qualities 1 \"!!d.ch. in 
truth a r e nothi nti in the objo~ta th9mselves, bu.t , o,..,ers to ,reduce 
v~rious sen3a.tions in us ••• ~s colors, sounds, tastes, :md so rorthn. 
The a.ttributea or ext ension, form, mbility, o.nd solidity are, accord-
i ng to Locke , in the s ub!lt o.noe, regardlecs or a peroeiving mind. The 
seco11ds.1·y qual ! ties, ho,,ever, do not exist :!.n the aubatanoe, but only 
~hen we perceive them. 
LocJ:e , then, ha.s establ1Eh9d the.t cubsta.nce is an unknoo:m soma-
thi1ig1 which sup~orta pa.rtl:, inherent qualities, 1>artly a.ttri'bu.t~s 
which tho ~erceiving mind adds to the conoe~t. 
2. Berkeley . 
Georc;e Berkeley ( 168S-l 7S3), pious bishop or the .:i.nt;lican Church 
in Ireland, carried. i'urther the epistemological investigations begun 
b:, Locke, and attacked eapeoially t-."IO p~ints in tlle system or Locke, 
besides giving the impulse to tu.rt.her investigation in this ti-9ld. 
Berlr..eley•a first point or attaok wa.s LooJm's diatinotion between 
prim.~ qualities, which inhc,re in su'batano-,, independently- or per-
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caption, s.nd. secondary qua.lit:!.os, ,1hioh exist in the nind that per-
oaivec them. Borkeley 11r guod t.'l_ t it is impossible to aep9.re.te the 
prim~riJ quL'.litiea or oxtens:!.on, form, solidity, and mobility trom 
t he second.Ary qualities or color, sound, e."14 taste. It is impossible 
to h:ive an idea or extension Trithout a.t the sam time giving it som, 
oscondar y quo.lit.,, of' color, sound, or taste. ·:1a mey th,rerore justly 
concll?do t hc:t :!.t the ::::e condg,ry qua.lit:!.es exi,:t only in the mind, then 
nlso the p r i mar y qu~lit i e s, which can be perceived only in connection 
,7itl1 th!3 s gco:nda r:, que.l:!.ties, exist only in the mind th'l.t perceives 
thern. 
T't10 second r eature or Loc~e • s system v.rhi.ch Berkele:, attacked m1.s 
Locke ' s i dea or substance ~s a. me.teria.l B.!ld unthinking substratum 
in wb.1ch quuli t i e s in..'lie re. Bis argument against this part or Locke• s 
system wa.s e. cor ollary or his proor that qualities exist only by per-
csption, and in perceiving· subjects. It is therefore a contradiction 
t o pl ace t he ex:!.stencg or a qua.lit:, in cm unua rceiv!n~ thing, such 
L'.s this M terial unthinking s11bstratum 1s said to be. Ee adds an 
e.dditionnl argument a.ga.:!.nst an interred but material substratum tor 
qualities. Just as, i t is useless to go outside or themin~ tor the 
q,.1alitie1: themselves, so it is l".lso unnecessary to go outside or the 
mind tor tha cause of t hose qualities as perceived by us. 
It is in this conneotion tha.t Berlcaley also incidentally in-
vestigs.ted the validity of the idea or caues. lie mays, it is absurd 
to make one thing the cause of another, ainoe all \TB can peroeive 
,11th our senses is a constant aucoess1on ot one event upon the other, 
and ·never the !)ower or agency which produces auoh an etrect. 
(Prinoiplea ot Human inowledge, Seoti~n 32.) 
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Acoording to the system or Berkeley, c;ua.lit1es do not exist 
without a. perceivin:5 subject,. and the idea or ::m unperoeiving, 
ma:ter1al support or substllnoe, a.s Y,"811 as the iden. or an inherent 
necessary connection bet\reen two events 1a inv~lid. 
3• Hume. 
Ds.vid .Hume (1711-1766), la.s t or th ESr ee.t ~ lish critical phil-
osophers, a.ooepted the conclusions or Ber koley •:Tith r ega.rcl to the Sllh-
jeotivity er the idese or substance and qua.lity. Humo s9t tor him-
self the task or investiga.tin,... the idea. or onuse. which , as \'18 b&ve 
seen, Berkeley had a.lready touched in pc.osing . 
Hume divide s sll the ob,jects or ll una."1 r e nson or enquirl' into 
t\':o ld.?lds, P.ela.tions gr_ Ide a.s , and !!n.~ ...r_ Fc.-.ot. The rormor, he 
B9..y& 1 "are discoverable by the l!'ere oper a.tion r.,f' t ht'ught, -::ithout 
depandence on what i s any-.;he re oxi tent in t he u.'liver !la., . ~Enquiry, 
• 
Seo. IV, Pe.rt I. R11nd, P• 31/i.) .\11 1·easoning , ho•:reve r, concerning 
the latter Hems to be f'ounded on t he rela tion or c auss and orreot. 
•By means of' th'lt relation a.lone" he .says , "we ca.n go bayond the evi-
dence or our mam1·y and s enses.• { op. cit. !'• ,311~) Bu t how do w 
arrive at the knowledge or C"use and rroct, The Jmowledge or ca.us, 
end etf'ect •arise s entirely i'rom ez:psrience-, •::hsn .,,e !'irul that nny 
particula r objects are constantly conjoined •:.1t h sa.ch other•. (op. 
cit. P• 31.S) F.or he se.:,s: 
11.!o objeot ~ver discovers, by tho qu!lliti~s Ylhich a.ppel1l' 
to the senses, '91thsr t.lie ca.usea tu ich produced it, or the effects 
·.?hioh \7ill ari.!:e .from it; nor can our r ~ason, •.uu1nistec! by u:-
perieno., dre.\'t any inferenc-, concerning rea.l existence and mtt.er 
of" f'aot•. 
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Hot sa.t1cf1ed ~1th this rozult or his 1nvestig~tion, R~ C"lrrieo 
on his inquir.:, till r urth~r 'l."ld ~sks th, queetion: 11'.".:hat 1a th-, 
. 
round!l.tion oi' all conclusionc tram axp9rbncs7•. H9 ans'Mra th.19 
question negatively uhen he snys {op. cit. Sec. !7, PD.rt II, 320): 
11 !!:von a.f"ter we have experience or the operations ot ca.use 
and e:rreot, our conclusions f'rom that exp~riance are m 
i'c.muclsd on rea.aoni:nfi, or an:,• process of +he un-3.er!Jta.nding•. 
'Sx_pcrience '1;1vos 1s a kno,7led~ or C!lUS'9 ed e.f'f"gct :!.'or "l :;,er-
ce i .... -:, -n1 ::>- t evsnt only, but the mind cert:1ir.ly int'!r that ~.lsc, 
1.ri "1e r utu1·e "l. eil:1111." r c.-bjac t ,·111::!. produce a dmila.r erract. But 
t he b~~is :!.' ·thia 1.nf'o1·0n0~ ic not a chain of' rsa.scning, tor ~re \'toul.d 
than bg eblc 17.> prod•.1ci! it b:, introspection. '.Th'9?1Co 1 then, cri-:'!s 
~op. cit. Sec. YII, ?a.rt II, P• 339): 
0 T11e mind i s c .r1~ d by hsbit, upon hhe a,r-eara.."loe o:!.' one 
svent, to expect its usua.l atteniant, and believes tbat it ~ill 
e:::!st. Thi a connection, t herai'ore, \·1h1oh -:;e ~ in the mind, 
tis c~otcma.r· trc.nsition of the i~ina.tion rrom on~ object to 
itis: ltS~~l 5!.ttondont, ia th~ sentiment or 1n,press1on f'rom which 
we i'orm thll idea or pcn-:or or neoesearlr connection.• 
As a. result of' the investiga.t:!.ona of' HW!l9, \"18 arrive s.t th.econ-
clusj1on that the idea. ·or cause and ef'reot, or or neoessar11 con-
nection is not va.11d, th~tio, in ma.tters or fa.ct or perceived object■ 
the law of' c ause and ef'teot doe■ not operate v.'1.th a.bsolute certainty, 





]Jmr.anuel Kant (1724-1804), th!! grea.tl3st or imern philoaophers, 
a.t.ttlcked the problems ·.7hich here concern us f'rort fU! a.l togeth'9r dif'-
f'erent angl e . . lie hir aelf' ~x:,lain:1 ·t;ha 41:rr-,rer.ce betmJan his s:,s-
tem am ·t.hosc cf his :;;>r -cb>cessors 1n the worch: 
"!".alE) thesiE or all true idealists, from the Elea.tics do\-m 
to n1.shop Bsr l:.sley, ! ::: conts.ined in the !'ollow4ns st~tsf:'!9nt: 
. 
.ll kno.,led;;e ::-.cquired thro1J3h tho aensos : md experience is a 
mere lllustion, and the ~:t·uth e::dsta 'lDly° :!.n th9 1-leaa 1'u1-nished 
b:, pu1·e understanding o.nd rea.so n. The principle thut governs 
"nd det9r1!'J.ne s th .J vhole or m:, i de11lism is, on t l':.e oontre.r:,,, tha.t 
nn:, kno-;!ledge or thi~ s tll~t proceeds from pure •.mierstanding 
or r ea.son l"" a. 1c.ere illusion, o..."ld th'l.t truth 1!: ro,.m<l in exper-
i snce :uon-, .n ( :>,uoted !'rom Janet -md Sea.i1'.cn' .Histnr!{ q!:, ~ 
Th~ diff erence be~~een 7.c.nt flJli th9 :.tn~lish critical philoso-
hors l i es in t h9ir 1'!eth.cd. Tm E:!1$11 h chool ane.l;,rs "?d our i deas, 
. 
the f"a.c•ilt:,, of' k!io~vledge ruid its QO~ivit:,r in ~~psr1anCB ■ ".".lb.en we ana-
lyse t1xp2r1"ilnC9 or sen,s1l)il1t:,, \70 find. the.t it is composed. or elem9nts ·· 
trom t-:JO sources, one from the faculty or ~.nowlac\ge itself', (which Kant 
odls ~) tbe other f'rom external sansa.tion, { which :Kant calla 
matter). That which is constant a.ud upiversa.l in our experience is 
~. v.itiile t hat v,hich changes and varies is ta~ttsr. Since this t'orm 
give to sensation its order snd rel~tion, 1t cmmot itself'~ seusa.-
tion , but M'~st be capable or being aons1d.ered b~ itself, ~p~rt troa 
eensa.tion. Jhe.t tb3n ia the 12!:!! or paroeptiany 
• 
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ience , we must cbctr aci~ all contributions of' the understanding, Buch 
~s ubst:mce , t ore~, divisibility, and all t.lia.t i c du, to sens~tion , 
9.s solid i ty, col or , ~'l'l•l S'l on. ·:nia.t r emaino, nam,l:, space and time 
belone;s t o the subj eot i w constitution of' the mind, apart f'rom ~hich 
the se f'orms ca.nnot ba pred.icat sd or anyt hing \"!h~.t'lv r. ~Transcend.9ntal 
Aesthet ic., S9c. I ) . 
Sp~ce , or ax't!:>n~! on 1~, acccrdi~ ly, not an empirica.l concept, 
~oich hns beon ~er !ved f r om ex?rnal ex~eriences, ~s Berkeley ar..d 
Hume bll.d ·t e..ught. !!ant se.ys : 
0 For I could not be conscious that certain of' ~~, sensa-
tions are i--elat ive to so!!'.ething outside or lr.9 1 that i s , to some-
t hing in a di rter ent par t or space f'ro~ the~ i n which I myself' 
a.m; nor could I be conscious of t hem a 9 outsids or mid b9s1de 
one anot!1or 1 •:,e r e I not t1.t the same t i me conscious that the:, 
not onl:, are diff'erent in content, but are in dif'f'e r ent ~l aces. 
The ct>nsciousness of' apace i s , therefor,, necessarily presupposed 
1~ external pe1~eption. No experience of' th~ external relations 
. 
or sensible +..h!nga could yield the idea of spa.ca, because with-
out the consciousness of' space there would 'be~ external exper-
! ~nce whatever.• ( Transcendental Aesthetic, S2d. I. Rand, p.383) 
:!ha"t: theu is ape.ca, Kant anam,rs: 
11 Spaoe ia in no sens9 a property or things-in-themselves, 
nor is i t a relation or things-in-themselves to one another ••• 
Space ie nothing but the form of' e.11 the phenomene. or outer 
aense. It is the subjective condition ,71thout ,'lb.iob no external 
perception is poBBible. ■... \'le, theref'ore, attirm the emp1r:!.od.l 
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.!l!!!!.lli. or space I a.a raJ;f1.l"ds all pos■i ble ext,mal exp,rienoe i 
but •:10 a lso ~ into.in 1 ta transcendental idea.11 ty, or in other 
norcla , vre hol d that spa.ca 1s nothing a.t a.11, 1r its limitation 
to possible experience i s ignored, llml it is treated a.a a necea-
so.ry condition or things-in-them.salvos.• (Transcendental Aes-
tll9•t ic1 !le.ml , ,385) • 
Just cu: Ita...11:t ha.d analysed sensibility, experience,. mid percep-
tion in lli s T1·a.nscendenta.l il.Gsthet ic, so h9 JJ.0\7 proceeds t o a.na.lyae 
t he unde 1·a t 11ndi1ig, 01· the concept-nnki ng P.ncl j ll<lgi~ f'aoul ty or the 
mind in bh Trfl.Dscencle:ntal Lo:;ic. He finds t hat a.f't er 2.b~tr actine 
a.11 t he m~'te1·icl. f'1.1.rn1Ghed b:, senaibili t :,, f'rom a judgment or the u?lder-
et!lnding , ,; e bave 1uelve f'or•rs of' und.e r s t a."nc!ir-& , -::hich he ca.lls ca.te-
:;02.,1-as . Tb .. :, a.ra P:. ori ori !)ri:ncipl e s through ·:rhich the understa.nd-
i n~ oper a.to~. Thsy ~re: l. Unity . 2. Pluraiity . 3. Tot~lity. · • 
4. ~e~li t i . S■ Hega.tion. 6. Li mtaticn . 7. !nherenca and Subsis-
tenc~. 8 . c~usality and Dependence. • Col!Ul!U.~ity . 10. Poss ibility-
! mposdbi l i t:,r. 11. l:::dst9nc~-Uon-existence . 12. Necuisit:,- Conti n-
gency . Th re ere what Yi&Ult calls :;,ure conceptions. Into t h9m no 
ssns i b111 ty enter s . Beco.uce tbese conc~ptions a.re ,!; priori e lements 
ot t.~ ur.dor stllllding, {VerJmuep:f'ungabsgrU'te ) _by them alone t he under-
standi ng 1 o a.bl'l to order the complex content ot perception into 
concept s. 
But these oa.te~ories are limited in their applic~tion to the per-
captions • ..!cnt says: 
nBut there i s a very seductive ~d d9ceptiv9 terienc~ to 
employ thltt ~ure lmowled&e or underat:mdi~s ~nd those ~rinciplea 
• 
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by thsmsalvo::, cmd to a.pply th"Jm even bsyo!'ld t.'le 11m1 ta or e7.-
perionco . nn1:, in experience, horrevar, c~ an:, mttcl" or obj9ot 
bet i'oLUld to nhich th, ,u.re conception!' or W'l'1erE".►."lD11ng -m.7 'b9 
appli ~d . n,~re i s thus a d l". ~..,r tbct under.st· nd:!.:ig, ,::i·th a 
1?13re eru,,:.r or r ation~lit:,, ma.:, !?!~?-;-, !l m t oria.l ,,1sg or 1t OJ purel~, 
i'o:i."Jllul :pl·inci 1 s , WJ.d pe.ss ju.dgm9nts upon e.11 obj9Cts without 
di cti nc t:!.'>r. , whether they be ~iven to us or not, ~"ld perhapti 
av n o.l tl out~h they cs.?ll'lot be given to l\S o.t a.11. That '"'hich is 
marel~ a c~non to~ the criticism er umerstandir..~ in its empir-
ic l u3e , ia mi suoed , ~hen it i s supposed to be L~ or~on that 
1t1n!' b:, cmplo:,1,;d un_ver30.1 l :, t'.nl\ ~-,1 t hout 1·estriction. 0 ( Transce ,i -
nt ~l Lo&ic , ?~rs.gra., h 4, ~&Uld , P• 391 ■) 
Th'3 •o;rnl t or I~.nt ' :J e:;::!l.wein:i.tior.. o!' ths e::,ist•.ua10logiceJ. probl'lms 
\";h ie -1.1.> uch 0 1.1l· f':!.elcJ cu.n ~ eummarized a.s fol lo ·;s: 
Spa.cs ( a.-ttonsion nnd form or r1e;ure) is a torr.1 or ::,erception 
which r:!.ni a a. valid !'.pplicP.tion onl~, to t.liings given to the mind by 
sens~t i on. 
Su bst :m09 i E n en te~r :, of' relation ~ In.Ji9renoe o.nd $ubdstence) 
end is thue- a i'orm or umlerstanding, which ha.a validity only when 
!1.pplied to things given to tI1e mind b:, :p9roaption or ssnsibility. 
Co.use is WJ.Dthe r category 01' relation (Causality and Dependence) 
~thich iE used correctly only rib.en applied ,..,!thin the llmi te ot ex-
perience . 
Imi:enotrabilit:, ( Traneoendentnl Aesthetic, Ro.nd., P• ,381) :!.a 
due to sensation and ha.a no va.11d1 tl,' except r1hen determined by the 
rorrns or perception, space and ti&. 
.... 
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Kobility (succession in apace), mini;; a ros•ut or a conbina.tion 
or the two torm or perce ption, spac9 end ti~~. h~s vali~ity only 
uhen ap!)liod to pllonom9na1 and ca.nnot be correctly a.) plbd to t..'lingc-
in themselve s. 
,S. Herbs.rt. 
John Friederich Rorb9.rt ( 1776-184].) ,vai: 2. disciple or ltant ,mo 
developed the Irmt:!.an notions on 1;hei rcuilistic side mld did much to 
stem the ~ido or Absolut~ Idealism ,mich ~aept throus}l philoso,hical· · 
circles nrter .. e.nt ' s dea.th a.s a. result or the influence or ~ch'illing, 
l1e~e-l , 0..11.•l Ficht3 . .\a a. realist, one \' ould oxpeot him to develo-:, 
a doctr ine or subnta.11ce a.ud a.ttr1 bute s ,,7hich ~-."Ould ri t in •.":1 t!l th9 
!,>h:llo:::t>;bical basis Qr the Reformed o.rgu!Jl'3nts. But not so. 
He ooi1ns 1 liko ~11 critical philosophers, with ml' examin~tion 
er th-9 i:)henoll\3na. •.-:hich .,e ~.A~l:l. t>erceive in the ro·rtn or prop-
ert113o , \'lhich at.first sight seem to 1nher 9 :!.n substance. But sub-
s t flnce 1:: not t he ul til'IIZl·to eRsance , but 1 t 1 s in turn compooed or 
oe rte.in ol er.1en ts 1 ..-Jhich Her'!ri.rt c e lls ~!. (Rea.le). ".:1ha.t we call 
111!'.tter in ordinary speech, i.e. an extended substance in which 
qualities inhere , dooc not exist in Herbartian philosophy. Uatt9r 
ia a.n i mnmteria l and uner.temled something, '.'lh.ich 1•9ceives the prin:e.ry 
qualities or extension, JDDbility, and a_pace occupe.t1or. from the rela-
tion vrhich the eleJ11Bnt!l.l Reali! hold toward one another. ~ace, ti•, 
and motion a.re the e:x:presaion in s.batra.ct ot the89 relations. 'All-
gemeine ·~etaphysik, Paragraph 328, ·.erke, Vol. IV, 381.r.) 
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6. Schopenhauer • 
• i\rthur Schopanhc.uor (1788-1860), continued the ep1st9mlog1cal 
investiga.tions nl.ong the line£ 1~14 down by !ant. He did much to 
aimpliry a..~d cla.rity Kant's system o.ncl mode further discoveries in 
tbb field. Bio cllier mrit lies !n his reduction or t..'J.e mult1pUc-
1t:, or Xc.nt 's rorms or knowladr;o ( time and spa.ca a.a rorm11 or perce:p-
tion e.nd the t ,:;elve ca.te~ories s.a rorms or understanding) to a u?1ity 
in the princi~l o or sutticient r9ason. 
Thie p1·!11cipl e may b9 sta.ted in the words: •Ifothing exists \"Ii th-
out its 1·eo.son to1· bs ingn - n'Nihil !§.i !J:n!. ra.tiono 2.!!t. otius sit, 
guam Al.2.1! At'~ a • This princ iplo lie e .! priori in 011r consciou meas • 
It oxpr es~es in ito roost general rorm ths relations b9~1een the ideas 
t'thir.h eo to 111::1.ke up i-.he world. J~s t.~eoe re.lationa !'all into four dif'-
r e rent c l e s nes, £ 0 a.l so the ~rincipl e or sufficient reason has a four-
t old r or m. Onl:,, t\Yo or those r,;,rms :ire or vo.lue to ua in our present 
s tudy , n,l t hese ~e sh~ll now ta.ko up seris.tim. 
The firct i'orm in \":hi oh the principle or aui'i'icient r.taaon appears 
is t he l ~\7 or causa.lity, or the principle or surricient rea.aon of be-
coming. Thi e form or tho principle is applicable to th~ideas of per-
ce.,. tion , t7idc:!:i a.ra re!''1ra.ble to st'me sensation of our bodies, and. ··hich 
a.re capable or being perceived under th, forms of s,ace end t:l.a. 
nut these tvro rorms have no m1Hming when ka,pt 41at1nct, tor it :I.a only 
by means ot a union or th1J ti.m through the law or causality that co-
exiRtence, and consequently, permane!lOe or object~ is po1ts:l.ble. 
Matter, then, being the poa9:l.bility or co-ex:l.atQnce o.nd ot permanence, 
is the union or spnco =ind. tin; l!llltter :!.s oa.uaal:l.ty, an-1 noth:l.?Jg mr~. 
The existence of mtt.ttor ia therefore entirely rel11tive, 'l.Ccord.:!.ng to 
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a relation which is vnlid onl,v within its lim!ta, e.c in th9 case ,.,~ 
apa.ce and ti.~ . 4U£0 such unalterable c~..ara.cteristics or m~tter as 
s nce-occu~a.tion , i :r.:-~9netra.b!lity, extension, infinite divisibility, · 
peraist9ncc , .olJ:!.lit y P.ro dep'!lndent u.::;,on th9 cl~riv:a.tion of' th• oasen-
til\l na'tu't"e or ma.ttor r1·om tho f'onr. or l:n0,·1led;e or which ,,.,a a.r 
,!!:. E~ conscious Qnd t ll r a r o re va.lid only :1ith1n theaa l i mits. 
( ·1orl-l Ila ::1, l 'ill".d I ds o.1 e~ction 4 i Four!'old Root or the :rino iplcr, 
or Surti ~i ent aea.son, Ssct ion 21.) The l~w or cs.u.salit~ ~lso, be i?iS 
condi t ! on_i b~• t h o witle r s 't a.ndin,z, cnn only be o.p:glied to chc.n:""s which 
t ?Jco p l ac. i n ths. phenomsn9.l ·:101.·ld. chopauh'l.uer aa.:,s 'l'l-rioernin; th9 
i llis u: o!' ... h _ la.w or ca.usa.11 t y ~ Fourtcld P.oot, ecticn 24 ) : 
·cdlll b~g ht e inen solch•n misus e ot t he l a~ ct c ~usality, 
e ort mu.11 das Ceaet z dor Ifa.u aa.l:!. t!l.et :nd.' ot••;a.s .!ndere s , o.l a.ui' 
!2!'~£!!.n.5i-en, in d e 1· uns ompiriach se~obenan., Mter19lleu 
J e l ·i; an ·.enaet , z. 9 . a.ui' die i!aturkro.oi't•, V19rm'Jogs •:.olche r solche 
Vcn •aem!e r unsen uel>'Jr hB!''.lt ers t mooglich aind i oder a.ur die •·0 t.rie, 
e.n d r i o vor g,:thn i oder aui' d~c "fel t c;ar.ze • 1:1.l ··:elche l da.zu ein 
ab,..olu ... objel--tive s , n icht duroh w:isern Intsllelrt ~adin:;t9s :a.ein 
b iu'91o:::·t -:re1-r!en mus s ; ouch noch son,t Cl\i' -ma.ncherle i -;=ise. Ich. 
ver.·•'3! se ier al~ d'la i 'll de ?" n••:elt a l s '"':!.11'9 un Ver~to1iun:; 11 
B?.nd 2 , !~p. 4, s. 42 !'~ . (,3. ,\ui"l. I!, 46, f's.) d e.rue b 1· Gl9Bagta. 
!l9r Ursprunt; solches :Zissbrmicbs 1:?t allerJ.l, toila, d!l.ss man 
den Bsgrif'f d~r Uro~che, wi~ u.~zaehlige ~n~ere in der .:Otaph:,sik 
und Uora.l, viel a E!!.,!! i'aast; tails, dass !!!:!ln versisst, de.ss 
d~s Gesetz der Xausa.litaet zm.,.r eine Voraussetz'.l?!g 1st, die ~ir 
mi t aut die ·. rel t brin:;en, und welc~e die Auschauung dor J:lin:;e 
ausser UDE -m,e~lich u::i.cl t, dasn vrir je~och eben d9sht1.lb n1C~'!.t 
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b9rocht1gt sincl, ein9n sr,lchsn, Q.US der Vorri~htunz unser o 
• r r.enntnbs ver r!t"legens ontcpr1ngenien G runclsa.tz a.uch a.usaerdem 
uncl un~bhae:ng1~ von Letzterem a.ls di9 tu.er aich bsetehend9.~wige 
Or dnwig der r ol t und a.lles Sxi st1r '.lndsn :sol tend zu m~chon. 11 
"nie ag~o!ld f or:n or the :,~inc1ple or sufficient rsason a.:,plie~ to 
t o 8 e i d e ~s ~!dich ore out s ide or perception, i.e. general .concepts . 
!:n this r o r-11 it 1s th9 p r i nciple or ";ha a•Ji'i'1cifmt reason or !~')wing, 
i.e . i t exrn-al!l ses t he t;rou?'..d or ~ ju.rlgmitnt. The principle or tho sid'-
i'ic1ent r e ~.aon of' lnr,•::i ng in rali,.tion to ju-J.g,r.ents 1 r ouri"old , :!..a. 
th9 g1·01.1n1 o , u on .,-,hich th'! t2-uth o!' o. judgm?1nt d'9pends , a.re or :ro•Jr 
ki n1e . P. :iudc;me11 -i.11'1i ch h s as 1 ts g;rowid o.n,:,t.°111Jr judgment 1s e. 
].o~i.2,S~ ti·uth i th:it .,:hicb lla.s its grou..l'ld. in sense perception is a. 
JNl.t e ri .1 t n 1th ; that ·.,hicll has 11;s ~round in the i'ormg or pure sens1-
bi.U. ty ( s p~ce, tim: , a.ncl ca.usal.i t:,) and of the underets.nding ( ths 
principl e of s~.r~icient reQson, etc.) as conditions or e.11 possibl e 
exP9rience ! e a liYnthetic:-..1 .!:. nrior~ jud~ll'snt. Finally, the tour 
l a•11s or t hout91t ( 1 . i1. subjoot is eque.l to th~ awn or its predica.tes. 
2. A subject cc..,mo't e.t one tb:e have a given predice.te a.i'i'irmed l'.nd 
denied of it. 3. or~~~ contradict~ry o,pose-J. predicates one 11111~t 
belong to every subject. 4. Truth is the relation of a judgm9nt to 
something outside it, as its sufficient ground.) J!ln)' be the ground 
or a judgment, in which case it possesses metalogical truth. 'l'h9se 
four classes or judgments, b9ing all phases or the principle or the 
sufficient reason or lcnO\rl.ng, possess validity only Tlith regard to 
tlle phenomenal world or idea. 
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Just so, the whole principle of' auf'1'1c1ant reason is applicQ.ble 
onl:, within the limit s or s.11 possible exper1anc9. Sc,hoperiha.ur ll!J.¥11 
(',"lorld a.a 1:!111 and Idea., Section 7, P• 41, Ha.lda."le and Kemp): 
nThe principle of aurt1c1ent rea.&on is not, as a.11 schol-
as t ic phi l ~sophy Jl!4int~ins, a veritas a.et, rns., that is to say, 
i t does no·t possess rm lmconditioned validity before, outside 
of , and ~bove the worl d . I t i s r el ative m d cond1tionr.l , and 
vft l i d onl ~ i n the sphere or p~enomen~, c..'l'l t huc i t 'C!}_y a.ppea.r 
.. the n9ce sso.1·~, nexus or B1>9.Ce and ti'l!lO , 01· a.a t he l ,·.- or cauc-
c.l i ty , or a.s the l aw or the ground or kno\·rledse. The inner 
na:ture nr the :o r l d , the t h1ng-1n-1 tsolt oen never b e:, t ow1d by 
the uidilllce or this principl e , t or a.11 thct i t l eads tc ~"1111 be 
round to b do,c>endent and r el at ive and ~,rely phenomenal, not 
~ho t , ing-in-i+.selt.n 
Tc,,, slUllJl'.a.rize ohopenha.•l9r' s dootrini, then: 
.tatt91• or s•1l>st Mce 1a D'.91"8 notion within the limits or time and 
s pa ce , 1.-:! . the pllanoNn:il world. 
Ca.use , unde r ~tood in the sensoot t he principl e or sutticient 
r ec.son or bacoming i s an ~ Rrior1 construction or the mind, ~hioh hft s 
vali d i ty or.ly within t h~ lil!lits or ~ll possible experisnce. 
Impenetr a.bili t y is an uno.l ~ ra.ble cl!ur acteristic or mat ter, of 
· i ch we ~r~ na w ch conscious.!: oricri as or sub9t:mce a.n~ D tt~r 
itself'. 
'obilit y, beine; succession of ti· .e in e~a.ce, i s va.lid onl :, 1n 
the world or idea . 
La.\·ts of Thought ( Idonti t:,, Contro.d.1ot1on, Excluded 'm.ddle, qp<i 
the Principl e or Su1'f'1oient Reason) h~.ve ve.l1dit:, only in the ~-:c>rld 
26 
of.' phenom~na. t>.ml unde r no c1rcumst:mcao , r:5. th regard to en:,t.'111"'~ Qut-
sido of' it. 
7■ La.tar Philo sophy . 
To est d ~ ·.'!J in detnil the t-haori =c of.' :ul the la.ter ph1losopher--
sinoa '3ChO):l"lnht'.usr until no\'I \":ould 'b9 a neac!lega r epoti tion of.' alr,ady 
f.'~m1li~r c ncepts of' substc.nce, s,~ce, t1mo, mot1or., etc. The:re are 
l!l'-inl:, t • o "l;rontls of.' thonght in phi 101:ophy sinctS th~t · tin,. 1::1 th~r 
H: is Idc o.l1at1c,, :lua t-:- ~r.:ho ~.nf'luenca or l:.eG::>l ::],roon, Br=.d!::>:,- 1 
Boo:.mquet, Royco , ::cTa.g;; .rt, !!o;·:13on, Eoc'-~inz, :?z-1~1~-Pat ·t:!.son or 
Rsa.11a",1c ! !331•·1:rand :iluecc,11 , .orry, !iolt, Spa.•.ildin0 ). Th~ i dae.list:!.o 
vie , holrls JU"::.l:nl;r to tho notion or ,,1,bsta.uce with ,·:hioh "."!9 beca:ms 
f.'a1Uil1Qr in our stu¾y of.' Ber~elay anc RW?!ei vhila the realistic vi~n 
hol d s th t the a nee do.ta of' a.ct!la.l peroaption tt.rc, the only- +.rue r ~ct~, 
~n1 the 11t .in.g" 1::: t.lie entire, cla.ss of' i •l:s :i.ppea.r anoe , i ncludi not 
only t ,10::ze a.ppa11r :c\nces tbl.'.-1; a.re actuc.:.ll~, ssns-, da.t:i., but th'! B8nsi-
biH».1 or .1,:10:::Gibls aen~e d'!l.t'.l.1 ·.:!!ich represent the a.pp3:ir:inces the.~ 
~ould r. ri~e Yara n ce!'t~in kiml or obsc,rv9r in a certain rel&tion to 
tha ob~ect. Tl i s la.tter view 1E not so ver1' ditterent f.'rom that or 
Herbart and Cm:!. bn con9'.dorod s.t ths sau time ..,,:1th his in rel sting 
thoM to th9 Reformed ~rgwmnts. 
.. 
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III. Conolusions . 
·,;e ha.ve no~·, s?t=tch-.,d '!»th th'l Rei'orli:'lda.r.;amsnts ega.1::ist the 
!lee.l Pr ooenc'e or the body a.nd blood or Christ :!.n the Lord• a Sapper 
a.nd th'!.l more reosnt epi ten:olo~c!ll. inV9£t1~a.t:!.on£ end t!le:!.r result's. 
The a.ttgn·t:ive re!.'.der '.7:ill no 1 ba in a pos ition to torm his CT:m con-
Cl!l:-ion on t:he b:l.sie or the mg,t9ria.l orrered. But it mi&ht bs ··:all 
to f o1'1!1Lll nt e a.n sc~ri ze thee-., conclus ions into a. de1'1n1ts r orr~. 
In -loi n•~ so, Yio sh~ll consi der ea.ell basic ph:!.loaophical conce?;>'tion 
sep·1r 'l.t9ly Qlld a.ppl:,• to i ·t: the r asul t s of tha ph1losoph1ca.l:!.nvo:s:t1-
~c.tions. 
l • . tt:ributea. 
Tho ph iloso.hical ba.sic of the P.9for!!ed ar3Umnt rrom the nature 
or a.ttr!bu.t'3s ~ perhaps be bsst stc:.ted in tho forJ! &iven to thia 
ba d~ by Di·. Chu·les Hodge, nho e:a.:,s : "ilttri'blites inh"!re in su.bstonca n • 
. 
The o.t t?.•:!.butos of' e::t9ns :!.on~ mobility, impene.t1•ab:!.lit:,r, and t e rm are, 
~.ocord1nt; to t.1-ii E: \'10",, outside or !\ th:!.nk:!.n: and parceiving eu.bjeot. 
B11t 9.S •:re ha.vc, seen, Barkelc:,y and Hwns shoffltd that also these 
so-ca.llerl prim:i.ry qu~lit:!.e m d o.ttr1 blites or ZUl.tter, su.ch u exten-
sion , mobil:!.t1•, i mpe!letre.bil:!.t:,, and f'orm a:x:1st onl:,r b:, rea.son ot 
their be i ng peroa ived.. Their 98118 is in "Derc1p1, to express 1 t in 
t:he .,.'!Ord.a or Berkeloy; their balng lies in bsing 1'9rceived. They 
therefore possess no objective reality, a Vie\7 shared by practically 
all DK>dern idealists from Hegel 'to Royce. Amt tbs ~sul ts of' tha1n-
vest1ga t1ons of Irant and Sohopenh:lu.er strongthc:,n t. 1:t vie,,. They 
ha.ve sho\"ID thnt spa.ca a.nd time, and there!'ore al.so the a.ttr1butes ot 
I 
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extension, i mpenetr~bility, rorm (3pace-occupation., an~ mb!lity 
(aucceosion or ti~o 1n sp~oe) a.re onl~ the necessary conditions of 
a.11 oac1bl e . , h9nom9na.. Accord!~ to tho view or Herbart, these 
tt-tt1•1butsa a.re i·ela.tiona bet,•19en th-, va.riouc _?.ealrh but he '!>y no 
J!l-9o.ns den!os tho poaa!bil1ty or their exiatenc9 \"lithout thPB9 rela-
• 
tiona. "!.e see then, thnt the first argu:ant or the Retorllllld ls band 
upon a. pbilosophionl conoe,tion \"lhich has long been ab!l.mionecl, and 
\~1ioh ha.c nover a.wa.in b'Jan revived sines th9 da.ys or Berkeley. 
Tbe philosophical be.Bia tor the a.rg111'18nt or the R•rol'Jll9d .rrom • 
the n~t ur e or subatonco ma.y nga.in be p11t in the words or Dr. Cha.rles 
lJorl~e: "The nttr!buto~ or a substance constitute !ta eBSenoe•, or in 
other ·:102·d c, cubst~ce 1a an unthinking, materifll. subatra.tu?l 1n ,;b!ch 
I t ~~a t ~~s ph!losophice l doctrin9 or subst11.~ce t ha.t aroused 
Ber teley to an inve'stiga.tion, in which he ehmred tl1u.t such a substance 
i s 1mlk)soi~le , oince a. quality could inhere only in a psrceivins _sub-
·j eot,and that it wa.s totally unnecessa.ry to go 0•1tside or the Bind 
i'or t he ca nse ,o.r qut'.lit1es ;perceive.d b:, u1s. Xcmt sl10-:,ed his f'uma-
m,nta.l a.gr ee1n9nt ,1th this view by r.nldnd Inherenoo and Subsistence 
(u~ n wbioh the concept substance is based) a. ca.tego!"J or relation, 
1rhich, aa an.!: priori element or th• understanding, b!le validity 
only ':ti thin the lim1 ta ot a.11 pooa1bla experience. Schoponhe.uer 
a.1£0 makes the concept or. aubatanoe valid on11, within th, limits ot 
ei~srieno6 uh.en he makes th~ existence or ffl!l.tter dependent upon the 
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f"orms or oen~1 bili t:, ( spao,, ti!!l8, and th., la;:t or ceuisali t:,). The 
o.rg11.w:ent of.' t h e Reror.nsd is based upon a philo=ophioal doctrine ot 
subatr.noe wllioh ~ither denies to the idaa. or substance !:.ll validity 
(Ber keloy, Hums, and all WDdern Ide~lists), or ~t least limits it to 
the world. or pheno1n-,na ( Xant, Sohopenhau.er) 1 or def"ines it in such a 
\'!ay tho.t t he Ref"orr.!3d. a rsument loses its rorce ( Herbart, JCOdern 
t!eo-Re!'.l i s t s ) . Since in th.e o.rgumnt in question th-s eubatance of' 
Chr i st's bod.:, is !il.d??U t ~;cdl:, outside or, !l'!-i be~rond the , ..,orld of.' phs ~ 
norn~na , ~ny and evo1-:, in!"erenoe dr~~'!l f"rc~ the nature of' substa.no9 
i n eE pi ric ~l ~e~lity i s i nv~li d • 
.3. 'Je.use. 
tu: ":13 ho.ve poi ntotl out in the considera:~ion of' the s t o.tem'!nt of' 
!lr. ! •• !~. liodge tha"i: a tt1•ib•.1te s ar e a.ctive powars or a substance, 
t hsr e :!. Q still a. l".O l 'O f'und.o.rnantal phU.o~oph:!.cal bas is t'.>r th• Ref"crmed 
.· 
a 1"(;W11ent::i tha.n 1;bo se . previc.-usl)r considered. It is tbeidea or cause, 
of' noce csai•y connection , ahd the principl e or sui'f"icient reason in 
gene r a.l. ..t the ba.sic of' every Reformed e.rgume:!lt ago.inst the ! eu 
: 1•esence ue t i nd. th!,! :;,l"inciple of au.f"t!ciant rea.son in sor:,..= r or ??:. 01· 
other. The ~ost common f"orm 1s th~~ et~ted tiy Dr. A. A. Ho~~ in 
the ,·101--ds; 0 Pz-opertie s -.re not sapara.ble froa tho aubst!Ulcesof" ._,h!ch 
t : e l' 9.r .. , act ive pot e r"I! . Hore e. O!'.usa.l relation or neoesst1.r3,• -con: ec- . 
tion is assUJlled b 2t-.1een subst~"lCB o.nd. attribute. 
But ~lread:, BarI:ele3,r httd pointed out that the causal ocn."lect1cm. 
hnd 1'e1n.g only ~J being perceived. Hume -: ent turther. Be 11honed 
th~t a necessary connection bet\-n,en obj9Cts bas no Qbaolute certainty, 
a1noe it 1s based on a JDen.tsl habit. !ant nade ca.use oneof' the 
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twelve C-tGgoriac or +..ho undcn~~t:,.mli:i:t '.7h:!.ch can only be •.1.:::0:l cornc l!' 
i-:1 i;M. n _possible a::q:eri'!'t?C-3 . !:cllo:.enh u'lr ~l'ld. by 111!!! tine: th~ use 
b~~ upon c.n lllJ- ,iqunt ? , hiloso, hic~l_v:!.e~ or eaus~ !t.~d ettect ~s 
on t r 11 .1 veri t y , ·:!hich is ?>!>l1C!:1.bl9 in b-.>th t i me a.nr• !!tt'lrn!t:,. 
But t:ta~ 9pi t>t trDl o ic~ 1nvest1iatior..s in r 'Jia.rd to Cllu~e hr.ve 
ct i ).1 :,.notll r 'b'l dn:! ~n t.'19 b2 s:!.s or the Rsrorl?''ld ~r :;wr.~n:it. The 
ra.Vt'rite cu :pr '9::s:!.ons or t 'lo • ofor!Ped •:.tb.en trea.ting the .:..uthercn doc-
?l'inc:!. •• l e of' ~ ffi,;: :!.ent Ro!l. on) in their f avor, o.n-! ,a owi a.f!'orc! to 
a.d:mit t i c c!.c.1'!1. But a.:;: i·10 h!lve ; o1nt9d out :!.n our trea.tmant or 
Gchop~nha.uor , s spsc:!.a lly 1n t..'1s seotio11 co~cerni~ th9 principle or 
~ui'f'i c:!.ent· rea.son or kr.o~ing , thss- lal'.;.'s of thougl1t a.re va.l:!.d only 
. . 
T1t t . :!.n th'l lh.:!. t a of' t..'10 phenoll'.ena.l world, am again the j r :U::;ument 
1' lls to the ~roun'-1. , tor thl3 sub ject or their a.rgumant :!.e 11.d.mittedl:, 
not 1n th9 rorld, btJ.t above ud ,:,ut:dde or it. 
· :e h~w seen t.lla t th9 philoao~h1ccu l:Beis or the Rei't'l'J!!l9d a rgu-
ments against the Re.al Presence or the body and blood of Chr1at 1n 
the _Lord •s Su:;>p3r 1 from the n:ost superr1o1al, that bs.sod u,cn the 
nature or attributes, to the moat .f'und.o.mfntnl, tha.t based on the lcme 
or thou{;ht, 1o not in conformity ·.11th the bel!'t ph1loaophical thought 
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or th two precedi~ conturi9s. {lb~ t conslusiona do '·'"' drmr from 
tbnt to.at? 
":Te do not m~o.."1 to clcim on t he -b~sis or our conclusions th~t the 
Raa.l Pr~aence or t ~e oody nnd blood or· christ osn be poaitib9ly con-
ceived or un~erstood by _a.ny finite hur.:.an mind whioh is bound by rea.s~n 
or i ts i nnnt"? const1 tution to this toms or its understs.mlir.g and th'! 
l ci·:s or it~ own tho~t. But ._.,., do claim on th-.. buia of' our .1nvea-
t1ge.ti on tba.t this ta.ct doea not render the Real Fras-..noe of' the body 
and "blood or Christ in the Lord I a Supl)er i m:,osai le, or e,::clud.9 t.'ie 
poEs i bil;ty or the Rea.l Preaencs or Christ•~ bod1 and blood in~ dif'-
re1·ent Jl!0do t han t lle phanom9na.l, and t.'lult is all the wthera.."1 doctrine 
In conclus19n ,te .,,i sh to quota i'rom a. trimsla.tion ot J. F. 
l?la.tt ' s !Tuobi~n) t1•ea.the o,· Deits.te Christ!, •.71 ich appesred '.'!1th 
s11cll hir:;'li r ctc0111mendc.tion in the Reformed Bi blics.l P.eP?rtory !:!'m. P?'inoe-
~ Revie...,. (V. 160 .r.) Th.9 argumentation herein brought to banr on 
. 
t he doctrine or tho Doity or Chri t, c:m with equal f'orce be a.pplied 
to th".l Lutheran doctrine of' the Rea.l Presence of' th19bod:, and blood 
or Chriat in tlla Lord I a Supper. The quota.tion reads s.a !'olla.'!a: 
11/m.d •::e freely admit tha.t neither the oonne."C:ion, nor the 
dif'!'erence b3t\1een tJie persons in th9 Goc3ihend ·oan be cono9iwd 
or, poc!tively; in other ~,ords, they oan be knorni naither by 1n-
tu1 tion, nor by o.nlll.ogy. But we den:, that 1 t i'ollo-:,s trom the s~ 
premises, tha t ou.r dootrine of the relation bev.vsen tho Fathgr 
:md Son, resting a.a i ~ does upon suoh hip author! ty is '1rra-
t1onsl. 01· absu.rd. To set do\':D as false or absurd, ..-:h s.t ever Tre 
cnn i'orm no dei'in1te 00?10aption ot (Sea Ulrich's Inatitut. Log. 
• 
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et !~ta.ph:,z. P • .302.rr) 12: as it c roo.n bom blind s h'lu"l.d denounce 
a.s i mposci bls 01· f'a.bo t.lie de scription or e. ;,a.1n·t 1ng, urel:, be-
deny th'J 1oso1~111ty or rela.tions except thoco ~h:!.ch oxi£t ~ ~n~ 
l::):· l:.'3r r.a.l obj ,;,cts or such cu: m b:> inferred r rcm t!lcm, ~v:!.nees 
noro.noe or •:. nt or reoollection , ~-,1th respi,ct to the 1111'.11:.s or 
huu1..nn W'l'ler s"..o.ndin:;. 'l'hll trut~ is, that .!.'1"01!! o ur i,>&rtia.l ~no :1-
ed,-;o ,;:hich ,. a b.n.ve , even o:r thin~s aubject to the co~izP.nce or 
Oltr inter na.l 'lnd oxl:.er nc.-.1 sens,;,s1 "!te have no 1·:!.ght to conclude 
t h· t ·l:!le onl:, r~l ations of' •:1h1ch tho~ are cap:ible a.re 'lUDh a.s 
e.::i:Jt bs t~·, en o::ter?!.-~ objects . a 
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